Equilibrium CEO Contract with Belief Heterogeneity by Bianchi, Milo et al.
1253 
“Equilibrium CEO Contract with Belief Heterogeneity” 
Milo Bianchi, Rose-Anne Dana and Elyès Jouini 
April 2021 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Toulouse Capitole Publications
Equilibrium CEO Contract with Belief Heterogeneity∗
Milo Bianchi† Rose-Anne Dana‡ Elyès Jouini§
April 16, 2021
Abstract
Consider a firm owned by shareholders with heterogeneous beliefs and run by a manager
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1 Introduction
Corporations are often owned by a large number of investors, who may hold different beliefs
say on the likelihood of success of a new product, on the payoffs associated to an investment
opportunity, or on the future prospects of the market. It is well known that, under some
conditions, shareholders with different beliefs can reach an agreement on the preferred plan of
action by trading contingent claims in a complete asset market. Even then, however, decisions
are often delegated to a manager, and it may be very costly or impossible for shareholders to
observe the manager’s actions. A classic question for shareholders is how to design a contract
that would make the manager act in their interest.
This is the question we address. We consider a firm owned by shareholders with different
beliefs and run by a manager. There is only one production and consumption date. The manager
chooses a production plan, whose output is uncertain. Shareholders cannot observe the plan
chosen by the manager, they only observe the realized production, and they can trade in a
financial market that consists in all the assets that are contingent on the realized production.
A contract for the manager specifies her compensation as a function of the firm’s production
and possibly some restrictions to trade in the financial market. We ask whether one can design
such a contract so that the manager chooses a plan unanimously preferred by shareholders.
Our analysis builds on Bianchi, Dana and Jouini (2021), who introduce the concept of
manager-shareholders equilibrium (in short, m-s equilibrium), defined as follows. Given a com-
pensation scheme and a price, the manager chooses a production plan that maximizes her in-
direct utility, that is the maximal utility she can obtain by choosing a consumption plan in her
budget constraint. Given their expectation about the production plan and future wealth, share-
holders choose consumption plans that maximize their utility under their budget constraints.
At equilibrium, in addition to the usual market clearing conditions, shareholders should cor-
rectly anticipate the plan chosen by the manager and they should unanimously prefer that plan
to any other feasible plan. Bianchi et al. (2021) assume that the manager does not face any
trading restriction and show that a m-s equilibrium exists only if the manager receives a linear
compensation and if she has the same characteristics as the representative shareholder.
This paper is motivated by the fact that the above result can be interpreted as showing the
impossibility to reach such an equilibrium. In fact, in practice, it may be impossible to find a
manager with the same characteristics as the representative shareholder. As shown in Bianchi
et al. (2021), that would require for example finding a manager with a declining or even a
stochastic discount rate, even if all shareholders have constant discount rate. This impossibility
is tightly linked to the fact that shareholders hold different beliefs, it would not arise if we
were to start with a single shareholder. This begs the question of whether commonly observed
restrictions to insider trading for the manager can help reaching an equilibrium in case the
manager is not like the representative shareholder. If this is the case, the next question is which
properties equilibrium compensations have and in particular how they deviate from linearity.1
In order to address these questions, we extend the analysis by Bianchi et al. (2021) and
allow for restrictions to trade on the manager. In our framework, a m-s equilibrium is a list
1As we will show, linear compensations are equilibrium compensations also in our setting when the manager
and all the shareholders have the same belief.
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of a compensation scheme, a space of allowed transactions, a production plan, consumption
plans for shareholders and the manager and a price that fulfill the properties above. The
main contribution of this paper is to provide a framework where indeed an equilibrium can be
reached if shareholders can restrict the manager’s trades in the asset market. In addition, we
characterize the associated compensation scheme, and highlight some of its properties that are
qualitatively valid irrespective of the exact form of belief heterogeneity.
We start by describing some properties of a m-s equilibrium, showing how it relates to the
standard concept of production equilibrium where the initial production set is replaced by a net
(of manager’s compensation) production set and defining a representative shareholder associated
to such a production equilibrium. We then move to our main task of designing a contract for
the manager that can lead to a m-s equilibrium. As implied by Bianchi et al. (2021), trading
restrictions are necessary when the manager is not the representative shareholder. In fact, in
order to characterize an equilibrium compensation, we focus on the case in which the manager
is not allowed to trade in the financial market. As we show, the compensation schemes defined
in this way are the only candidate equilibrium schemes, even if the manager were to face milder
trading restrictions. A key result is that the manager implements an equilibrium plan only if
her compensation is designed so that the marginal utility of her compensation is proportional to
that of the representative shareholder at equilibrium. In this way, the manager’s compensation
leads her to mimic the behavior of the representative shareholder at equilibrium.
We can express this condition in terms of a differential equation that the compensation
function should satisfy. In general, solving this equation involves a fixed-point problem since
both the production equilibrium (if it exists) and the representative shareholder’s characteristics
depend on the compensation function. Moreover, as detailed below, the fixed-point problem
need not be well-defined.
As a useful starting point, we consider the special case in which shareholders have identical
beliefs. In this case, our differential equation can be explicitly solved. We show that, if the
manager shares the same belief as the shareholders, a linear compensation can be used to
implement a m-s equilibrium. If instead the manager is more optimistic than the shareholders
(in a sense made precise below), the compensation should moderate the manager’s optimism
by offering a lower compensation rate when the firm’s production turns out to be very large.
Similarly, when the manager is more pessimistic than the shareholders, the compensation rate
should be larger for larger realizations of production.
Turning to the general case of shareholders with heterogenous beliefs, we address the fixed-
point problem by taking a reverse approach. We start by a production set net of the manager’s
compensation and suppose that there exists a production equilibrium for that set. We obtain the
compensation function that solves our differential equation and construct the associated gross
production set. We then show that this compensation function is an equilibrium compensation
when the production set corresponds to the derived gross production set.
This allows to derive some properties of the associated equilibrium compensation. We show
that, as long as the manager holds beliefs that are between the "most optimistic" and the "most
pessimistic" (again in a sense made precise below) of the shareholders, an equilibrium compen-
sation has the following property. When output realizations are extreme, the compensation
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is such that the instantaneous utility of the manager is much larger (in absolute value) than
what she would reach with a linear compensation. Notice this does not require having an exact
knowledge of the belief of the manager, and it shows that, relative to a linear compensation, an
equilibrium compensation induces the manager to attach more importance to how the different
production plans behave in terms of extreme realizations.
We conclude by developing an example of a net production set for which we can explicitly
compute the production equilibrium and, given the belief of the manager, define an equilibrium
compensation in closed form. In this setting, the representative shareholder’s belief leads to
overestimate the level of risk relative to all shareholders. We show that the associated equilib-
rium compensation has the properties stated in the previous paragraph, and provide numerical
illustrations that highlight the effect of increasing belief heterogeneity.
We think our results have important implications for the study of agency problems. Our
model is most closely related to a common agency problem, in which an agent faces multiple
principals with possibly conflicting interests (as started by Bernheim and Whinston (1986)).
Our key distinctive feature is to embed this problem in a general equilibrium setting, in which
the asset market is used to mediate and possibly align shareholders’conflicting interests. This
approach allows highlighting the importance of modeling explicitly the equilibrium process
leading to the definition of a representative shareholder. As we show, the insights one would get
by taking the representative shareholder as given would be different, and possibly misleading,
in settings where shareholder heterogeneity is important.
The general equilibrium approach fundamentally changes the incentive problem of the man-
ager, who chooses a production plan and at the same time a consumption plan while possibly
trading in the asset market. This opens the possibility for the manager to deviate and implement
a different plan, while increasing her utility by trading on her private information and changing
her consumption decisions. For this reason, we can abstract from effort costs on the part of the
manager; our incentive problem stems from the fact that the manager, unless restricted, can
benefit from trading on her information about the chosen production plan.
We show it is necessary to impose trading restrictions to the manager in a setting in which
the action she takes cannot be observed by shareholders. Without those restrictions, it would be
impossible to find a compensation scheme which induces the manager to choose an equilibrium
plan. This provides a rationale for the commonly observed restrictions both to insider trading
and to non-exclusive contracts.
We also qualify the view that agency conflicts are minimized when the manager owns a
substantial part of the firm’s shares, which has motivated the rise in stock compensation. Our
analysis instead emphasizes that the compensation rate should vary with the level of produc-
tion and provide conditions under which this rate should become very large or very small when
realizations become extreme. This result stands in contrast to the argument in favor of com-




Our paper builds on the literature on aggregation of preferences and beliefs in asset markets.2
Our focus on agency problems between a manager and shareholders is however novel in this
literature. Similarly, managerial compensation has typically been studied under the perspective
of a representative shareholder (see e.g. Murphy (1999) and Murphy (2012) for reviews). We
provide new insights by embedding the choice of the compensation in a stock market equilibrium
with heterogeneous shareholders.3
Part of this literature has analyzed the characteristics of the optimal contract when the
manager and the shareholder hold different beliefs (see e.g. Adrian and Westerfield (2008);
Giat, Hackman and Subramanian (2010); Jung and Subramanian (2014)). Our approach is
different as we consider a setting with several heterogenous shareholders and, importantly, we
introduce the possibility to trade in an asset market. In this way, we can derive endogenously
the properties of the representative shareholder and, in addition, study trading restrictions as
part of the managerial contract.
In line with the literature on optimal contracting, we emphasize that, in a setting with
asymmetric information, it may be beneficial to prevent the manager from trading in the stock
market (Fischer (1992)).4 Our novelty is to show how trading restrictions, and the form of
equilibrium compensation, can arise from a different mechanism: the interaction between moral
hazard and shareholder heterogeneity. Moreover, as mentioned, moral hazard in our setting is
not driven by private effort costs but rather from the fact that the manager’s beliefs may differ
from those of the representative shareholder and that she can in principle trade on her private
knowledge of the production plan.
The way in which information asymmetry is introduced makes our paper in line with the
probability approach to general equilibrium developed by Magill and Quinzii (2009). Indeed,
we assume that shareholders do not observe states of nature but only the production outcomes,
so from their point of view, production plans only differ by the outcomes’probability distribu-
tion. Accordingly, we consider contracts that are contingent on the possible realizations firm’s
production as opposed to being contingent on exogenous states of nature.
Finally, we relate to the literature on firms’objectives when shareholders are heterogeneous.
Magill and Quinzii (2002) review fundamental problems posed by market incompleteness, as
well as classic contributions addressing these problems. Bisin, Gottardi and Ruta (2016) study
competitive equilibria in a production economy with incomplete markets and agency frictions
and derive fundamental welfare properties.5 We instead focus on the design of the compensation
scheme and keep shareholders’objective as simple as possible by assuming a form of market
2Recent contributions include Detemple and Murthy (1994); Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005); Jouini and Napp
(2007); Jouini, Marin and Napp (2010); Cvitaníc, Jouini, Malamud and Napp (2012); Xiong and Yan (2010);
Bhamra and Uppal (2014); Atmaz and Basak (2018).
3Alternative equilibrium models have instead focused on the labor market equilibrium (e.g. Gabaix and
Landier (2008)) or on financial market equilibrium with a representative agent (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia
(1982)).
4This literature has also pointed out at beneficial aspects of insider trading, such as improving the informational
effi ciency of market prices (e.g. Leland (1992)). We abstract from this issue as in our settings there are no investors
apart from shareholders. We refer to Bhattacharya (2014) for a recent review of these issues.
5Other recent contributions include Demichelis and Ritzberger (2011), Magill, Quinzii and Rochet (2015),




We consider a firm owned by a group of shareholders with heterogenous beliefs and run by a
manager. There is only one production and consumption date T. The information structure is
modeled by a probability space (Ω,F , P ). The firm produces a consumption good, which we
use as numeraire, according to a production plan y. This plan is a random variable and y(ω)
defines the production of the firm at date T in state ω.
We denote by X the space of F measurable production and consumption random variables
x. We denote by X ′ the space of state-price densities p where, for a given state of the world
ω ∈ Ω, p(ω) corresponds to the price of one unit of consumption at date T in state ω. For a
given price p, the value of the consumption plan x is p · x = E [px] , where E is the expectation
operator under the probability P.
For these expectations to be well defined, we have to further impose that production and
consumption plans in X are such that E|x|p <∞ and that prices in X ′ are such that E|p|q <∞,
where p and q are such that 1 < p < ∞ and 1p +
1
q = 1.
6 We denote by X+ and X ′+ the set of
nonnegative pairs, respectively, in X and X ′. For Y ⊂ X, we denote by Y+ the set Y ∩X+.
In terms of notations, while x and y will be used to denote random consumption and
production pairs taking their values in R2, z will be used to denote vectors in R2 and, henceforth,
generic values taken by x or y. As usual, x ≤ x′ (x << x′) means x (ω) ≤ x′ (ω) (x (ω) < x′ (ω))
almost everywhere, and x < x′ means x ≤ x′ and x 6= x′. Finally, we denote by µ the Lebesgue
measure on R.
2.1 Production




p ∈ X ′ : p · (y′ − y) ≤ 0, ∀ y′ ∈ Y
}
,
which corresponds to the set of linear forms that reach their maximum on Y at y. We will
say that y ∈ Y is positively exposed if there exists p >> 0 such that p ∈ NY (y). Note that
a positively exposed production plan y is effi cient in the sense that it not dominated by other
feasible production plans : @y′ ∈ Y, y′ > y. We denote by Eff+(Y ) the set of positively exposed
production plans.
We say that Y is smooth if, for all ȳ ∈ Eff+(Y ), there exists p >> 0 such that NY (ȳ) =
{λp : λ ≥ 0}. This condition states that at positively exposed plans, the tangent cone (i.e. the
polar of the normal cone) is a half space and it ensures that Y has no outward kink.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption (P)
P1 Y = K −X+ where K ⊂ X+,





is then a Banach space whose dual (the space
of continuous linear forms on X) is X ′.
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P2 Y is closed and smooth,
P3 If y ∈ Eff+(Y ), the random variable y has a density hy with hy > 0, µ−a.e. on (0,∞) .
Assumption P1 implies the classical free disposal assumption, Y − X+ ⊂ Y . Assumption
P2 is standard in the general equilibrium literature in finite dimension.7 Assumption P3 states
that for every positively exposed production plan, all positive values are possible.8 Indeed,
this implies that by observing a given realization (y(ω)) of a given production plan in Eff+(Y ),
shareholders are not able to exclude any plan y ∈ Y from the set of possibly chosen plans. This
assumption underlies the information asymmetry between the manager and the shareholders in
our model. Bianchi et al. (2021) provide an illustration of Assumptions (P2) and (P3).
2.2 Shareholders
The firm is owned by a group of N shareholders, i = 1, ..., N . We denote with νi shareholder
i’s initial endowment of shares, and we assume νi > 0 for all i. Shareholders have no other
endowments, and they are heterogeneous in their subjective probabilities Qi. All subjective
probabilities are assumed to be equivalent to P and we denote by M i the density of Qi with
respect to P, M i = dQ
i
dP .
A key ingredient in our analysis is that shareholders do not observe the plan y chosen by the
manager nor the state of the world ω. In state ω, their information is given by the realization
(y (ω)). As already mentioned, by Assumption P3, the observation of a given series of output
realizations does not allow them to infer the chosen plan nor the state of the world. It follows
that shareholders can only trade assets whose payoffs are contingent on y (ω). More formally,
let C be the set of contingent contracts C : X+ → X+ whose payoffs for a given y are of the
form c(ω) = C(y(ω)), for some measurable functions C : R∗+ → R+. Given y, shareholders only
trade consumption plans in C(y) = {C(y), C ∈ C}. We assume that markets are complete, or -
more precisely - full spanning, meaning that it is possible to find a portfolio of assets that pays
one unit if a given outcome for the firm is realized, and nothing otherwise (as shown in Magill
and Quinzii (2009), full spanning is typically much weaker than market completeness).
All shareholders have the same consumption space X+ and they are assumed to be expected
utility maximizers. The expected utility of shareholder i for a contingent consumption plan c
is defined as










for some γ < 1. We further assume the following:
7Note that this assumption is automatically satisfied when the production set is of the form Y =
{y ∈ X : E [F (y)] ≤ 0} where F is a given function with a bounded derivative. In such a setting, we have
NY (y) = {λF ′(y) : λ ≥ 0} for y such that E [F (y)] = 0 and NY (y) = {0} for y such that E [F (y)] < 0.
8 In this assumption (0,∞) might be replaced by some (A,B) for 0 < A < B. In this case, all the considered
functions that are defined on (0,∞) are replaced by functions that are only defined on (A,B) .
9The assumption that shareholders are only endowed with shares of the firm and that they have the same
CRRA utility is crucial for the proof of existence and uniqueness of a production equilibrium.
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Assumption (C)
1. For all i, M i and M iςγ−1 belong to X ′ for all ς ∈ K,
2. For all i, M iςγ belong to L1 (Ω,F , P ) .
Assumption (C) assures that shareholders’marginal utility is well defined in all directions
and that their utility is well defined on K.
2.3 Manager
The firm’s production plan is chosen by a manager. While we do not model explicitly why
shareholders need to delegate this choice to a manager, a standard argument is that they lack the
time or the skills needed for implementing the plan, which may require continuous adjustments
over time. Manager’s characteristics are similar to those of the shareholders. She is an expected
utility maximizer with instantaneous utility u, as defined in (2), she has a subjective probability
Qm equivalent to P with density Mm. Her expected utility of a contingent plan c is therefore
defined by
Um(c) = E [M
mu(c)] .
The manager is given a contract (Φ,W ) described by a compensation scheme Φ : X+ → X+ and
of a set W of transaction plans she is allowed to make in the contingent claim market, which
we describe below. As shareholders can only observe the realized production, the compensation
can only depend on the realization y (ω) . Hence Φ(y) must be of the form
Φ(y) (ω) = φ(y (ω)), (3)
for some φ : R+ → R+ assumed to be continuous almost everywhere. From now on, we
will use the same notation φ for Φ : X+ → X+ and for φ : R+ → R+ with the convention
φ(y) (ω) = φ(y (ω)).
As the compensation cannot exceed the available quantity of consumption good, we neces-
sarily have φ(z) ≤ z for all z ∈ R+ and, in particular, φ(0) = 0.
We next describeW, the space of transactions allowed to the manager in the contingent claim
market. We assume that W is a closed subspace of X. When W = {0}, then the manager has
no access to the market while when W = X, the manager has access to all contingent contracts
and she can trade just as shareholders. Given a production plan y, the manager’s set of feasible
adapted consumptions plans Cm(y) is
Cm(y) = (φ(y) +W ) ∩ C(y).
In particular, when W = {0} then Cm(y) = {φ(y)}. When W = X, then Cm(y) = C(y).
Assumption (F)
1. For all y ∈ K and all w ∈W, Mmφ(y)γ−1w belongs to L1 (Ω,F , P ) ,
2. For all y ∈ K, Mmφ(y)γ belong to L1 (Ω,F , P ) .
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Assumption (F) ensures that the manager’s marginal utility is well defined in all feasible
directions and that her utility is well defined when y ∈ K.
To explain how the manager chooses the production plan, let us introduce the concept of
indirect utility of production plans for a given price. Given a production plan y and a price
q ∈ C(y), let Vm(y, q) be the maximal utility of the consumption plans that the manager can
obtain by trading her compensation under her market constraint c ∈ Cm(y) and her budget
constraint q · c ≤ q · φ(y),
Vm(y, q) = max{Um(c), c ∈ Cm(y), q · c ≤ q · φ(y)}. (4)
The manager’s maximization problem in Equation (4) differs from what appears in standard
agency problems. First, our manager is maximizing her indirect utility, which depends not only
on her choice of the production plan y but also on the given price q. Second, the manager’s
consumption may depend not only on her compensation but also on the possibility to trade in
the asset market, which in itself depends on the plan y. This is a key feature that needs to be
considered in our equilibrium definition, as we will see.
Similarly, let V i(y, q) be the maximal utility of the consumption plans that shareholder i
can obtain by trading her share of production under her market and budget constraints:
V i(y, q) = max{U i(c), c ∈ C(y), q · c ≤ νi(q · (y − φ(y))}, (5)
where νi denotes her initial share and y − φ(y) is the production left to shareholders after
having paid the manager. Equations (4) and (5) show how the manager and the shareholders,
respectively, assess the utility associated to the various alternative production plans. They
compare their indirect utility under y to the one they would have obtained under any alternative
y′ ∈ Y, by taking prices q as given.10
2.4 Equilibrium
Let us now define our concept of equilibrium between shareholders and the manager. We have
in mind a setting with a large number of non-strategic agents. We take a general equilibrium
approach in which resource allocation is decentralized through prices and in which prices depend
on firm’s choices. The only source of risk we consider is -roughly speaking- generated by firm’s
payoffs and the Arrow-Debreu assets can be seen as options on the firm’s payoffs. We adapt
the general equilibrium approach so as to account for the information asymmetry between the
manager and the shareholders.
Shareholders appoint a manager with a contract (φ,W ) and delegate to her the choice of
the production plan. Given her compensation and a price q, the manager chooses a production
plan y that maximizes her indirect utility Vm(·, q) over Y and an optimal consumption plan
Cm(y). Shareholders maximize the utility of their consumption plans under their market and
budget constraints based on their expectation about the plan chosen by the manager. At
10Price taking is important to be able to define a consensus plan (see e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) for a
discussion on price taking behaviors and unanimity). Price taking could also be derived by considering a setting
with a large number of identical firms. The analysis would not be affected.
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equilibrium, shareholders should correctly anticipate the plan chosen as the manager, they
should unanimously prefer the manager’s plan to any other plan feasible y and finally, markets
should clear.
Definition 1 A manager-shareholders equilibrium (in short m-s equilibrium) is defined by a
contract (φ,W ), φ 6= 0, a production plan ŷ ∈ Y, a list of contingent contracts (Ĉi)i, a contingent
contract Ĉm, and a price q̂ ∈ C(ŷ) such that:
1. ĉi = Ĉi(ŷ) maximizes U i(c) s.t. c ∈ C(ŷ), q̂ · c ≤ νi(q̂ · (ŷ − φ(ŷ))),




i + ĉm = ŷ,
4. Vm(ŷ, q̂) > Vm(y, q̂) for all y ∈ Y ,
5. Um(Ĉm(ŷ)) = maxy∈Y Um(Ĉm(y)),
6. V i(ŷ, q̂) = maxY V i(y, q̂).
Our definition of m-s equilibrium is adapted from Bianchi et al. (2021) by considering that
the manager in our setting receives a contract (φ,W ) that may specify some trading constraints
W, while this was not the case in Bianchi et al. (2021).
From Assumption P3, when y is in Eff+(Y ), shareholders cannot infer the chosen plan
by observing the firm output, they choose their consumption plan based on their expectation
about the production plan chosen by the manager. Conditions 4 and 5 imply however that the
manager finds it optimal to choose the equilibrium plan ŷ and so, at equilibrium, shareholders’
expectations are consistent with the plan actually chosen by the manager. An alternative
interpretation would be that the manager announces the chosen plan to shareholders (who
choose their consumption plans based on this announcement), and Conditions 4 and 5 would
imply that the manager has no incentive to misreport her production choice.
Condition 5 is also important to highlight a key distinctive feature of our equilibrium,
relative to more standard agency problems in partial equilibrium. In our setting, the manager
is choosing a production plan but also a consumption plan Cm(y), possibly by trading in the
asset market. As mentioned, this opens the possibility for the manager to implement a different
plan and at the same time increase her utility by trading on her private information.
Condition 6 means that, given q̂, shareholders unanimously prefer ŷ to any other plan y
in Y . It is known that when markets are complete and shareholders run a firm according to
profit maximization, unanimity holds at equilibrium. We show that unanimity at equilibrium
also holds in our framework where decisions are delegated to a manager and shareholders trade
contingent claims on production under the condition that there exists at least one shareholder
who prefers ŷ to any other plan y in Y .11
11Notice also that we do not explicitly define any participation constraint for the manager. Adding such
constraint would be immediate, as discussed in Section 5.
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3 Equilibrium Properties
We first show that the manager’s equilibrium consumption equals her equilibrium compensation.
In other words, in equilibrium the manager does not trade in the financial market. We deduce
from the no-trade result that, for a given compensation scheme φ, the manager chooses a
production plan that strictly maximizes the utility of her compensation on the production set
Y . The shareholders solve a production equilibrium problem given the net production set
Y φ = {y − φ(y) : y ∈ Y }.
In order to state our results, let us recall the concept of production equilibrium associated
to the production set Y . Note that shareholders are not constrained to trade in C(y∗), where
y∗ is the equilibrium production plan.
Definition 2 A production equilibrium associated to the production set Y is given by a produc-





∈ XN and a price q∗ ∈ X ′
such that
1. c∗i = argmaxU i(c), q∗ · c ≤ νi(q∗ · y∗) for all i,




We now list some properties of a m-s equilibrium given a contract (φ,W ).
Theorem 1 Assume (P) and (C). Let ((φ,W ), (ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ) be a m-s equilibrium then
1. The functions z → φ(z) and z → z − φ(z) are both nondecreasing and differentiable,
2. Shareholders’income q̂ · (y − φ(y)) is maximized over Y,
3. The manager does not trade, i.e. ĉm = φ(ŷ),
4. The production plan ŷ strictly maximizes Um(φ(y)) over Y , Um(φ(ŷ)) > Um(φ(y)) for all
y ∈ Y ,
5. The triple ((ĉi)i, q̂, ŷ − φ(ŷ)) is a production equilibrium associated to the production set
Y φ = {y − φ(y) : y ∈ Y } that fulfills q̂ ∈ C(ŷ).
6. ((φ,W ′), (ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ) is a m-s equilibrium for any W ′ ⊆ W . In particular, it is a
(φ, {0}) m-s equilibrium.
From Point 6,W = {0} plays a special role since any m-s equilibrium ((φ,W ), (ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ)
remains a m-s equilibrium when the manager is not allowed to trade. We will use this property
in the next section, to provide a necessary condition fulfilled by an equilibrium compensation φ
by setting W = {0}. The next theorem, together with Theorem 1, provides a characterization
of the m-s equilibria associated to a contract (φ, {0}).
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Theorem 2 Let ((φ, {0}), (ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ) be a given list. Assume that C and assertions 3 to 5
of Theorem 1 are fulfilled. Then
((φ, {0}), (ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ) is a m-s equilibrium.
As a consequence, when (φ, (ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ) are given, there existsW such that ((φ,W ), (ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ)
is a m-s equilibrium if and only if Assertions 3 to 5 of Theorem 1 are fulfilled.
3.1 Representative Shareholder
We now define the representative shareholder at equilibrium. As standard, she is a fictitious
shareholder who - if endowed with the equilibrium production - would have no incentive to trade
at equilibrium prices. As we show in the next section, this is a key step for the definition of the
equilibrium contract.
As shown in Theorem 1 if ((φ,W ), (ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ) is a m-s equilibrium then ((ĉi)i, q̂, ỹ)
with ỹ = ŷ − φ(ŷ) is a production equilibrium associated to the net production set Y φ =
{y − φ(y) : y ∈ Y } that fulfills q̂ ∈ C(ŷ). Hence, there exists a representative shareholder asso-


























As ((ĉi)i, q̂, ỹ) is a production equilibrium associated to Y φ that fulfills q̂ ∈ C(ŷ) 12, there exists




in Λ and ν > 0 such that








Summing over i, we obtain:
N(λ̃) (ŷ − φ(ŷ))γ−1 = ν ′q̂ (6)








> 0. As q̂ ∈ C(ŷ), N(λ̃) ∈ C(ŷ). Therefore, the repre-
sentative shareholder has instantaneous utility u and a density M̃ ∈ C(ŷ) determined by
M̃ = N(λ̃). (7)
Furthermore, as ((ĉi)i, q̂, ỹ) is a production equilibrium associated to the net production set
Y φ = {y − φ(y) : y ∈ Y }, q̂ ∈ NY φ(ỹ). Hence, from (6), the representative shareholder maxi-








12Note that as Id− φ is strictly increasing, it has an inverse and C(ỹ) = C(ŷ)
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4 Equilibrium Contract
We now consider the possibility of designing a contract (φ,W ) such that there exists ((ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ)
for which ((φ,W )(ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ) is a m-s equilibrium. When this is the case, we say that (φ,W )
is an equilibrium contract and that φ is an equilibrium compensation. The aim of this section is
to define these concepts and to relate them to the fundamentals of our model, the shareholders’
and manager’s beliefs.
From Theorem 2 and its comment, φ is an equilibrium compensation if and only if Y φ has
a production equilibrium ((ĉi)i, q̂, ỹ) such that q̂ ∈ C(ỹ) and the maximum of Um (φ(y)) on Y
exists and is reached at ŷ defined by ŷ − φ(ŷ) = ỹ.
We start by providing first order conditions for assertions 4 and 5 of Theorem 1. The
following corollary establishes a link between the compensation function φ, the beliefs of the
manager and those of the representative shareholder, as defined in the previous section.
Corollary 3 Let ((φ,W )(ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ) be a m-s equilibrium. We then have
φ′(ŷ)Mmu′(φ(ŷ)) = µ(1− φ′(ŷ))M̃u′(ŷ − φ(ŷ)), (9)
for some µ > 0. Therefore, we must have Mm ∈ C(ŷ).
A necessary condition for the existence of m-s equilibria is that the compensation φ is such
that the gradient of the manager’s utility from compensation is proportional to the gradient of
the representative shareholder’s utility from net production.
When prices are given and the manager faces no trading restrictions, the only feature of
a compensation that matters is its market value. However, in our general equilibrium setting,
prices are endogenous, and they depend in particular on the production plan chosen by the
manager, which in turn depends on her compensation and on her constraints. Hence, the
shape of the compensation matters and Equation (9) constrains the shape of the compensation
function φ.
Without trading restrictions on the manager (W = X), as seen in Bianchi et al. (2021),
equilibrium requires that the compensation is linear. At the same time, from (9), under linear
compensation, the manager shares the same belief as the representative shareholder. When this
is not the case, there exists no equilibria and therefore the manager should bear some trading
restrictions.
Corollary 4 Let ((φ,W )(ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ) be a m-s equilibrium. If W = X, φ is linear. If φ is
linear then Mm = M̃. If Mm 6= M̃ then W  X.
We then consider the other extreme case W = {0}. From Theorem 1, item 6, the compen-
sation schemes defined when W = {0} are the only candidate equilibrium schemes even if the
manager were to face milder trading restrictions, W 6= {0}.
Let ((φ,W )(ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ) be a m-s equilibrium and let ỹ = ŷ − φ(ŷ) = (Id− φ)( ŷ) be the
equilibrium net production plan. As N(λ̃) ∈ C(ỹ) and Mm ∈ C(ỹ), there exists a measurable
13




From (9), we obtain that
φ′(ŷ)u′(φ(ŷ)) = µ(1− φ′(ŷ))h(ỹ)u′(ŷ − φ(ŷ)), (10)
or
φ′(z)φ(z)γ−1 = µ(1− φ′(z))(z − φ(z))γ−1h(z − φ(z)), for all z. (11)
Equations (10) and (11) provide first-order conditions at ŷ such that the manager and represen-
tative shareholder are aligned in the choice of the production plan. Note that while ŷ does not
appear explicitly in Equation (11), it enters in the definition of h as that involves the Lagrange
multipliers associated to the equilibrium net production plan ỹ = ŷ − φ(ŷ).
Although (11) seems to be a standard differential equation, it raises a fixed-point problem.
Indeed, the solutions of the above differential equation depend on h, which depends on the
production equilibrium associated to Y φ. An equilibrium compensation φ must be such that the
differential equation associated to the production equilibrium of Y φ has φ as solution. However,
for a given φ the existence of a production equilibrium associated to Y φ is not guaranteed.13
When h and φ are independent, Equation (11) may be solved to determine φ. This is the case
when the shareholders have the same beliefs, as we consider in Section 5. It is also the case
when the net production set (and the net production equilibrium) are taken as primitive as h
is then exogenously given, as detailed in Section 6.
5 Homogeneous Shareholders
In this section, we consider the case in which all shareholders and the manager have the same
belief, and the case in which all shareholders have the same belief, but that is different from the
manager’s belief. As mentioned, in these cases, Equation (11) can be solved explicitly and this
allows to build useful intuitions for the more general cases considered in Section 6.
5.1 The Common Belief Case
Suppose that shareholders and the manager have identical beliefs. We show that in this case a
m-s equilibrium can be implemented with a linear compensation, where we say that φ is linear
if there exists 0 < α < 1 such that φα(y) = αy. In fact, when M i = Mm for all i, h(z) = 1 and
from Equation (11), we obtain the following result.
Corollary 5 Assume M i = Mm for all i. If there exists a production equilibrium ((ĉi)i, q̂, ŷ)
associated to Y such that q̂ ∈ C(ŷ), then any linear compensation φα with 0 < α < 1 is an
13Along the same line, to show that ((φ,W ), (ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ) is a m-s equilibrium, given φ, we must prove
existence of a production equilibrium ((ĉi)i, q̂, ỹ) associated to Y φ. We then have to find a φ such that the
maximum of Um (φ(y)) on Y exists and is reached at ŷ defined by ŷ − φ(ŷ) = ỹ. We are thus led to find a zero
of a correspondence φ ⇒ (Id− φ)−1 (ỹ) − argmaxY Um (φ(y)). However, this correspondence may not be well
defined as for a given φ the existence of a production equilibrium associated to Y φ is not guaranteed nor that of
a solution to the problem maxY Um (φ(y)).
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equilibrium compensation.
It might seem puzzling that the compensation is defined up to a multiplicative constant
α. In order to define such α, one may assume that the manager has a reservation utility level
U∗ so that we must have Um(φ(ŷ)) ≥ U∗ (condition RU) and that shareholders minimize
the compensation cost, that is, q̂ · φ (ŷ) ≤ q̂ · ϕ (ŷ) for any other equilibrium compensation ϕ







One can also show that, among the compensation schemes that implement the equilibrium
production plan ŷ and satisfy condition RU, the linear compensation scheme is the only one
satisfying condition CC (see Appendix B).
5.2 A Unique Shareholder Example
Let us now consider a situation in which there is a unique shareholder whose belief is M (or,
equivalently, all shareholders have the common belief M) while the manager has a belief Mm.
We express these beliefs as a function of the equilibrium production ŷ, assumed to follow a
log-normal distribution. More precisely, the shareholder believes that ln ŷ ∼ N (a, σ2) while the
manager believes that ln ŷ ∼ N(b, σ2).We focus on the case in which disagreement is large, and
we say that the manager is very pessimistic relative to the shareholder when a− b ≥ (1− γ)σ2,
and that she is very optimistic relative to the shareholder when a−b ≤ −(1−γ)σ2. The following
corollary defines some properties of the equilibrium compensation in this setting.
Corollary 6 Let ((φ,W ), (ĉi)i, (ĉm), q̂, ŷ) be a m-s equilibrium and let us assume that the share-
holders believe that ln ŷ ∼ N (a, σ2) while the manager believes that ln ŷ ∼ N (b, σ2). If the
manager is very pessimistic relative to the shareholder, the share of the production left to the
shareholders should be bounded above. If she is very optimistic relative to the shareholder, her
compensation should be bounded above.
Hence, when the manager is optimistic, the equilibrium compensation should moderate the
manager’s optimism by lowering her compensation rate when the realized production is very
large. Similarly, when the manager is pessimistic, the compensation rate should instead be
large when production is large. These assumptions are clearly special, and they are expressed
directly in terms of ŷ, but they allow to convey our intuition in the simplest form. A more
general treatment of disagreement is developed in the next section.
6 Heterogeneous Shareholders
As mentioned in the previous section, in the case of heterogenous beliefs, Equation (11) involves
a fixed-point problem as h depends on φ. In this section, we overcome this dependence by
assuming that the net production set is given as primitive and that there exists a production
15
equilibrium on that set. As h is then a data of the model, h and φ are independent and Equation
(11) may be explicitly solved to determine φ. We first characterize the solutions of Equation
(11) that fulfill φ(0) = 0 and provide conditions insuring that such a solution is an equilibrium
compensation. Hence, this compensation be embedded into a m-s equilibrium associated to a
well-chosen gross production set. We next analyze the effect of belief heterogeneity on the shape
of the compensation. Finally, a fully worked-out example illustrates our methodology.
6.1 From Gross to Net Production
The setting is as follows: Let Y be a set for which there exists a production equilibrium
((ĉi)i, q̂, ỹ) such that ỹ has a positive density on (0, a) for a ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} and q̂ ∈ C(ỹ). The set
Y may be considered as the net production set. Let λ̃ be the production equilibrium Lagrange
multipliers. From equation (6), as q̂ ∈ C(ỹ), N(λ̃) ∈ C(ỹ). Assume that Mm ∈ C(ỹ). Then
N(λ̃)




Let φµ with φµ(0) = 0 verify the following differential equation:
φ′µ(z)φµ(z)
γ−1 = µ(1− φ′µ(z))(z − φµ(z))γ−1h(z − φµ(z)), z ∈ R+. (13)
It may easily be seen that a solution φµ of (13) has the property that φµ(z) 6= 0 if z 6= 0 and is
such that φµ and (Id− φµ) are strictly increasing .
Our next goal is to provide conditions on h that insure the existence of solutions to (13)
defined on R+ that fulfill φµ(0) = 0 and to characterize them. This will allow us to state
technical conditions insuring that the list ((φµ, {0}), (ĉi)i, φµ(ŷ), q̂, ŷ) with ŷ defined by ŷ −
φµ(ŷ) = ỹ, is a m-s equilibrium associated to the gross production set Yµ = (Id− φµ)−1 (Y).
To this end, let us consider the compensation as a function of net production, in other words,
the function ψµ such that
φµ(y) = ψµ(y − φµ(y)), for all y. (14)
As the function Id− φµ is strictly increasing, it is invertible and
ψµ(z) = φµ((Id− φµ)−1 (z)), for all z ∈ (0, a) .
Conversely as Id + ψµ = (Id− φµ + φµ) ◦ (Id− φµ)−1 = (Id− φµ)−1, from (14) we obtain:
φµ(z) = ψµ((Id + ψµ)
−1 (z)), for all z ∈ (0, a) . (15)
Let us show that ψµ verifies a differential equation which solutions may be given in closed form.
Differentiating (14), we get
φ′(z) = (1− φ′(z))ψ′(z − φ(z)).
16
From Equation (13), we obtain that:
ψ′µ(z − φµ(z))ψµ(z − φµ(z))γ−1 = µ(z − φµ(z))γ−1h(z − φµ(z)), for all z,
or equivalently
ψ′µ(z)ψµ(z)
γ−1 = µzγ−1h(z), for all z ∈ (0, a). (16)
Let us assume that h satisfies the following condition.14
Assumption (H) For γ > 0, the integral of h(u)uγ−1 converges at 0. For γ < 0, the integral
of h(u)uγ−1 is divergent at 0 and convergent at a when a =∞.





γ−1du when γ > 0,
ψµ(z)
γ = C − γµ
∫ a
z h(u)u
γ−1du when γ < 0.
(17)
Under Assumption (H), ψµ is well defined, continuous and increasing. Recalling (15), we
then have
φµ(z) = ψµ((Id + ψµ)
−1 (z)). (18)
Then φµ is well defined, satisfies φµ(0) = 0. As usual φµ : X+ → X+ and ψµ : X+ → X+ are
defined by φµ(y)(ω) = φµ(y(ω)) and ψµ(y)(ω) = ψµ(y(ω)) a.e.
Finally, let the gross production set Yµ be defined by Yµ = Y + ψµ(Y). Note that Yµ =
(Id− φµ)−1 Y. Hence, it is the natural gross production set when the net production set is given
by Y and the compensation in terms of net (resp. gross) production is given by ψµ (resp. φµ).
We can now state an existence result for an m-s equilibrium associated to Yµ and for the
existence of an equilibrium compensation φµ.
Theorem 7 Let Y be smooth and let ((ĉi)i, q̂, ỹ) be a production equilibrium associated to Y such
that q̂ ∈ C(ỹ) and Mm ∈ C(ỹ). Let Y be considered as the net production set and ψµ defined by
(17) be the compensation as a function of the net production. Let the compensation as a function
of the gross production φµ be given by (15) and the gross production set be given by Yµ = Y +
ψµ(Y). Assume further (C) and (H) and u◦ψµ strictly concave, then ((φµ, {0}), (ĉi)i, φµ(ŷ), q̂, ŷ)
with ŷ = ỹ + ψµ(ỹ) is a m-s equilibrium associated to the production set Yµ = Y + ψµ(Y).
In Appendix C, we provide conditions under which there exists a production equilibrium
((ĉi)i, q̂, ỹ) associated to Y and conditions under which ((φµ, {0}), (ĉi)i, φµ(ŷ), q̂, ỹ + ψµ(ỹ)) is a
m-s equilibrium associated to the production set Yµ = Y + ψµ(Y).
6.2 Properties of the Equilibrium Compensation
In this subsection, we consider the same setting as in 6.1 and we wish to highlight some properties
of the compensation schemes defined by Equations (17) and (14). In particular, our aim is to
highlight the effect of heterogenous beliefs on the shape of the compensation. We introduce an
assumption that implies some boundary properties on h. We say that shareholder i is more
14The Assumptions at 0 are, for instance, satisfied if there exists some ε > 0 such that limz→0 h(z)zγ−ε = 0
when γ > 0, and h(z)zγ is bounded away from 0 at 0 when γ < 0.
17
optimistic than shareholder j (or that shareholder j is more pessimistic than shareholder i) with










Note that this definition generalizes the definition of optimism/pessimism introduced in Section
5.2. Indeed, if i believes that ln y ∼ N(ai, σ2), we have that M
i
Mj
is proportional to y
(ai−aj)
σ2 .
We assume that there exists some shareholder i more optimistic than the manager and some
shareholder j more pessimistic than the manager with respect to ỹ = ŷ − φµ(ŷ). In particular,



























and that holds in particular for any shareholder who is more optimistic than the manager. That







where j is the most pessimistic shareholder. That gives the result in (21) for ỹ → 0. There-







This can be expressed by considering the compensation rate, defined by the function χ :




, z ∈ (0,∞).
We can show the following result.
Corollary 8 Assume that M i 6= M j for some i and j. Assume that (H) and (20) hold. If there
exists a m-s equilibrium, then the compensation rate in terms of net production verifies
limz→0 χµ(z) = limz→∞ χµ(z) = 0, for γ < 0,
limz→0 χµ(z) = limz→∞ χµ(z) =∞, for γ > 0.
(23)
Corollary 8 shows that the equilibrium compensation is such that the instantaneous utility
15We assume that the support of the net production plan is (0,∞). All the results can be easily adapted to
the (0, a) case.
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of the manager for extreme realizations is much larger (in absolute value) than what she would
reach with a linear compensation. Relative to a linear compensation, this induces her to attach
more importance to how the different production plans behave in terms of extreme realizations.
As the ratio between the representative shareholder’s and the manager’s belief is such that
M̃/Mm → ∞ as z → ∞ or z → 0, from Equation (16), the compensation counterbalances
this effect by having that the ratio between the manager’s and the representative shareholder’s
marginal utilities goes to infinity as z → ∞ or z → 0. As limz→0 h(z) = limz→∞ h(z) = ∞, it









tends to infinity as z → 0 or z →∞, which gives the properties of χµ(z) depending on the sign
of γ as stated in (23).
Let us see the consequences of (23) on φµ, that is the compensation defined in terms of gross




, z ∈ (0,∞).
Corollary 9 Assume M i 6= M j for some i and j. Suppose Assumption (H) and (20) hold. If
there exists a m-s equilibrium, then the compensation rate verifies
limz→0 κµ(z) = limz→∞ κµ(z) = 0, for γ < 0,
limz→0 κµ(z) = limz→∞ κµ(z) = 1, for γ > 0.
Until now, in this section, we assumed that there is a shareholder who is more pessimistic
than the manager and another one who is more optimistic. When the manager is more optimistic
(pessimistic) than all the shareholders, we have the following result.
Corollary 10 Assume (H) and that the manager is more optimistic than all the shareholders.
If there exists a m-s equilibrium, then the compensation rates verify
χµ(z)→0 ∞, χµ(z)→∞ 0, κµ(z)→0 1 and κµ(z)→∞ 0.
If the manager is more pessimistic than all the shareholders, then
χµ(z)→0 0, χµ(z)→∞ ∞, κµ(z)→0 0 and κµ(z)→∞ 1.
6.3 Example









: θ ≥ 0
}
,
where x̃ ∼ N (0, 1), m(θ) = a − b (θ − θ0)2 and a, b and θ0 are given positive constants.









We assume there are two shareholders with CRRA utility as in (2) with γ = −1. Sharehold-
ers only consume at time t and they have heterogeneous beliefs indexed by β. A shareholder of







, β ∈ {δ,−δ} .
All densities are expressed with respect to Lebesgue measure. We denote with νβ the proportion




(1− 2b) + 1
1 + exp− δ22
< 0. (24)
Proposition 11 Under (24), there exists a unique net production equilibrium (ĉδ, ĉ−δ, q̂, ỹ) such














































where λθ̃ the square root of shareholder’s δ equilibrium utility weight when that of shareholder
−δ is normalized to one is the nonnegative solution of
λ2 exp(−θ̃δ
√
t)ν−δ + λ exp(−
δ2
2
)(2ν−δ − 1) + exp(θ̃δ
√
t)(ν−δ − 1) = 0. (26)
We notice from (25) that the equilibrium production plan induces a larger θ and so a larger
exposure to the random variable x̃ when shareholder of type δ has at least half of the shares
(2νδ > 1) and is very optimistic (δ is large). If shareholders have the same endowment (2νδ = 1),
θ̂ is always lower than θ0 since any θ > θ0 would increase the exposure to risk and at the same
time decrease m(θ).

















Note that as C(ỹ) = C(x̃), q̂ ∈ C(ỹ) and M̃ ∈ C(ỹ) and this example fulfills the hypotheses of
the previous section.
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From Corollary 4, if ((φ,W ), (ĉδ, ĉ−δ), ĉm, q̂, ŷ) with ĉm = φ(ŷ) and ỹ = ŷ − φ(ŷ)) is a m-s
equilibrium without trading restrictions on the manager, then φ must be linear. Furthermore, if
φ is linear, then the manager implements the equilibrium plan ŷ only if she has the representative
shareholder belief (Mm = M̃). This means that unless the manager belief is given by M̃, we
have W 6= X and the existence of an m-s equilibrium requires the manager to be constrained.
Remark 12 Suppose that the manager receives a linear compensation. Let Em [x̃] and Varm [x̃]






































We remark (see the appendix) that Em [x̃] is a weighted average between the mean as perceived
by the optimistic shareholder (δ) and that perceived by the pessimistic shareholder (−δ), with
weight depending on νδ. When νδ = 0, λθ̃ = 0 and E
m [x̃] = −δ while if νδ = 1, λθ̃ = ∞
and Em [x̃] = δ. Moreover, Em [x̃] > 0 if and only if λθ̃ > 1, which is true if νδ is suffi ciently
large. On the other hand, while shareholders agree that Var[x̃] = 1, we have (see the appendix)
Varm [x̃] > 1. Hence, the manager should overestimate the variance of x̃. In other words, a
manager with a linear compensation evaluating the risk as shareholders would underestimate the
level of risk relative to what would lead her to choose ŷ. Hence, without constraints (W = X), the
m-s equilibrium exists only if the manager overestimates the risk with respect to the shareholders.
Assuming next that the manager cannot trade, let us search for a compensation ψ in terms
of net production such that ((φ, {0}), (ĉδ, ĉ−δ), ĉm, q̂, ŷ) with φ defined by (14), ŷ = ỹ+ψ(ỹ) and
ĉm = φ(ŷ) is a m-s equilibrium. Let us assume that the manager has a belief which coincides
with the objective one (x̃ ∼ N (0, 1)) and that shareholders have the same endowment,



















In order to ensure that the resulting compensation is nonnegative for all y ∈ (0,∞), we need to











From (17), we obtain
ψ(µ,C)(y) =
µy







where µ and C are arbitrary positive scalars. Note that u ◦ ψ(µ,C) = − 1ψ(µ,C) is a negative
combination of a constant and of three negative power functions. Hence u ◦ ψ(µ,C) is concave.
We can then state the following:
Proposition 13 Suppose that νδ = 1/2, 2k ≤ 1 and that the manager correctly believes that
x̃ ∼ N (0, 1). There exists a two parameters family of compensation functions of net production
which implement a m-s equilibrium associated to the net production set Y given by Equation
(28).
The corresponding compensation in terms of gross production follows from (14):
φ(µ,C)(z) = ψ(µ,C)((Id + ψ(µ,C))
−1(z))
It is easy to verify that limz→0 h(z) = limz→∞ h(z) =∞. Hence, the compensation in (28) has
the properties highlighted in Corollary 8: the compensation rate χ(y) goes to zero as y → 0 or
y →∞. Further properties are illustrated in a simple numerical example.
Suppose C = 0, a = 12 (θ0 − 1) and b =
1
2(θ0−1) . That gives θ̃ = 1 and m(θ̃) = 0. Suppose
also µ = 1, t = 1, θ0 = 3/2 and δ = 1/2 (shareholders’beliefs deviate from the objective belief
by 12 standard deviation). In Figure 1, we plot the resulting compensation ψ(y) (left panel) and
compensation rate χ(y) (right panel) as a function of the net production. We observe that the
compensation rate χ(y) is inverted U-shaped while the compensation ψ(y) is convex as y → 0
and concave as y →∞ (the convexity close to zero is not easily showed in the graph as it would
require a change of scale close to zero). In Figure 2, we plot the corresponding compensations
as function of the gross production, and we observe that those functions have the same shape
as the ones in Figure 1.
In order to see the effect of shareholder heterogeneity, notice first that if shareholders agreed
on the true distribution of x̃ (that is, δ = −δ = 0) we would have k = 0 and expression (28)
would give ψ(y) = τy and (the linear compensation). In Figure 1, we also plot an equilibrium
compensation rate χ(y) and compensation ψ(y) for δ = 1/4 (dashed lines) and δ = 3/4 (dotted
lines). In Figure 2, we plot the corresponding compensations as function of the gross production.
As intuitive, the larger shareholders heterogeneity is (the larger δ), the larger are the required
deviations from linearity.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that, when shareholders have different beliefs, reaching a manager-shareholders
equilibrium requires imposing some trading restrictions on the manager. As already mentioned,
when prices are given and the manager faces no trading restrictions, the only feature of a
compensation that matters is its market value. However, in our general equilibrium setting,
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prices are endogenous, an equilibrium compensation cannot just be summarized by its market
value, its shape as a function of the production realization matters. This is in particular analyzed
for well chosen families of beliefs.
While we have defined equilibrium compensations when shareholders can trade any asset
contingent on the firm’s output and the manager is prevented from trading, an interesting next
step would be to consider intermediate cases in which shareholders have access to an incomplete
market or in which the manager may face milder trading restrictions.16 We have shown that the
set of compensation schemes identified when the manager has no access to the market are the
only equilibrium candidates even under milder trading restrictions. More generally, one could
investigate which minimal trading restrictions would allow to achieve a manager-shareholders
equilibrium.
Another natural extension would be to introduce multiple firms. This would allow to consider
a richer contracting space, both in terms of trading restrictions and in terms of compensation,
and possibly to investigate issues of competition among firms for managerial talent. One could
also consider more general forms of endowment for shareholders. These are in our view very
interesting avenues for future research.
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Figure 1. Equilibrium compensation ψ(y) (left panel) and compensation rate χ(y) (right panel) as a
function of the net production for δ = 1/4 (dashed), δ = 1/2 (solid) and δ = 3/4 (dotted).
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Figure 2. Equilibrium compensation φ(z)(left panel) and compensation rate κ(z)(right panel) as a function
of the gross production for δ = 1/4(dashed), δ = 1/2(solid) and δ = 3/4(dotted).
9 Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof that z → φ(z) and z → z − φ(z) are monotone and
differentiable is in Appendix B, where we also show that when some consumption plan c does
not satisfy the market constraints c ∈ C(y) for some y ∈ Y , the market constraints are satisfied
for some slight perturbation of y.
Proof of the shareholders’ income maximization property
We first show that at equilibrium, the price q̂ should be strictly positive. We then show that ŷ
should maximize on Y+ any shareholder’s income at price q̂,i.e. q̂ ·(ŷ−φ(ŷ)) = maxY q̂ ·(y−φ(y))
and ŷ ∈ Eff+(Y ). Let us first show that q̂  0. Indeed if for some t, q̂t ≤ 0 on a set A of
positive measure, the shareholders’ and manager’s demand could be arbitrarily large on A
violating assertion 3 of the definition of equilibrium.
Let (φ,W ) be given and ((ĉi)i, ĉm, q̂, ŷ) be a m-s equilibrium. From items 2 and 4 in Defin-





Um(c) s.t. c ∈ Cm(y) and q̂ · c ≤ q̂ · φ(y). (29)
As ĉm solves Assertion 2 and Um is increasing, ĉm = φ(ŷ) + ŵ for some ŵ ∈ W ∩ C(ŷ)
and q̂ · ĉm = q̂ · φ(ŷ). Let c be a consumption plan of the form, c = φ(y) + ŵ for some
y ∈ K such that Um(c) is well defined with Um(c) > Um(ĉm). Since φ is nondecreasing,
we have min [u (φ(y) + ŵ) , u (φ(y))] ≤ u (φ(y) + (1− ε) ŵ) ≤ max [u (φ(y) + ŵ) , u (φ(y))] and
Um(φ(y) + (1− ε) ŵ) is well defined. We have u((1− ε) (φ(y) + ŵ)) = (1− ε)γ u(φ(y) + ŵ)
and Um((1− ε) (φ(y) + ŵ)) is also well-defined and Um((1− ε) (φ(y) + ŵ)) > Um(ĉm) for ε
suffi ciently small. Let x = ŷ and x′ = φ(y), by Lemma 14 there exists x′′ ∈ X+ such that
26
0 ≤ φ(y) − x′′ ≤ εφ(y) and C(ŷ) ⊂ C(x′′). Since φ is continuous nondecreasing with φ(0) = 0
and since we have x′′ ≤ φ(y), we may define y′′ pointwise by y′′ (ω) = inf {z : φ(z) = x′′(ω)}.
We have φ(y′′) = x′′, C(ŷ) ⊂ C(x′′) ⊂ C(y′′) and y′′ ≤ y which gives y′′ ∈ Y If we take
c′′ = x′′ + (1− ε) ŵ = φ(y′′) + (1− ε) ŵ, we have
(1− ε) (φ(y) + ŵ) ≤ c′′ ≤ φ(y) + (1− ε) ŵ
hence Um(c′′) is well defined with Um(c′′) > Um(ĉm), ŵ ∈ C(y′′) and q̂ · (φ(y′′) + (1− ε) ŵ) =
q̂ · φ(y′′) which contradicts (29). Therefore, we have
Um(φ(ŷ) + ŵ) ≥ max
K
Um(φ(y) + ŵ).
Assume that there exists y′ ∈ K such that q̂ ·(y′−φ(y′)) > q̂ ·(ŷ−φ(ŷ)). As φ is 1−Lipschitz and
by Lemma 14, there exists y′′ close to y′ such that q̂·(y′′−φ(y′′)) > q̂·(ŷ−φ(ŷ)), C(ŷ) ⊂ C(y′′) and
y′′ ∈ Y . From the definition of the indirect utility, we have V i(y′′, q̂) > V i(ŷ, q̂) which violates
assertion 4 of the definition of equilibrium. Therefore, q̂ · (ŷ − φ(ŷ)) ≥ maxK q̂ · (y − φ(y)).
Let us assume that there exists y′ ∈ Y such that y′ > ŷ. Without loss of generality, we
may assume that y′ ∈ K. We have Um(φ(ŷ) + ŵ) ≥ Um(φ(y′) + ŵ) and since Um is increasing
we have φ(ŷ) = φ(y′) on A = {y′ > ŷ} . This gives q̂ · (y′ − φ(y′))1A > q̂ · (ŷ − φ(ŷ))1A and
q̂ · (y′−φ(y′))1Ω\A = q̂ · (ŷ−φ(ŷ))1Ω\A which contradicts the fact that q̂ · (ŷ−φ(ŷ)) ≥ maxK q̂ ·
(y − φ(y)). Hence ŷ ∈ K and from there
q̂ · (ŷ − φ(ŷ)) = max
K
q̂ · (y − φ(y)) = max
Y
q̂ · (y − φ(y)), (30)
Um(φ(ŷ) + ŵ) = max
K
Um(φ(y) + ŵ) = max
Y
Um(φ(y) + ŵ). (31)











⊂ [0, 1] for all z with φ′−(z) = φ′+(z) = φ′(z) when φ′(z) exists (which is the
case almost everywhere on R+). Let y ∈ Y, v = y − ŷ and 0 < ε < 1. We have ŷ + εv ∈ Y and
q̂ · (ŷ − φ(ŷ))− q̂ · (ŷ + εv − φ(ŷ + εv)) = −q̂ · φ(ŷ))− q̂ · (εv − φ(ŷ + εv)) ≥ 0 or
−q̂ · v + q̂ · φ(ŷ + εv)− φ(ŷ)
ε
≥ 0.

























































































is bounded above by






















To summarize, we have q̂(1 − φ′+(ŷ)1v≥0 − φ′−(ŷ)1v≤0) · v ≤ 0 for all v. Therefore, we have
p1 = q̂(1− φ′+(ŷ)1v≥0 − φ′−(ŷ)1v≤0) ∈ NY (ŷ).
We also have Um(φ(ŷ) + ŵ) − Um(φ(y + εv) + ŵ) ≥ 0 and Um(φ(ŷ)+ŵ)−Um(φ(ŷ+εv)+ŵ)εv v ≥ 0









≤ 0 for all v which














= 0 which implies p2 6= 0. We have then 0 p̂ = p1 + p2 ∈ NY (ŷ)
and ŷ ∈ Eff+(Y ). Therefore, ŷ has a density hŷ with hŷ > 0, µ−a.e. on R∗+ and φ′+(ŷ) =
φ′−(ŷ) = φ
′(ŷ) a.e. Since ŷ ∈ Eff+(Y ), NY (ŷ) is generated by a single vector, (1 − φ′(ŷ))q̂ and
φ′(ŷ)U ′m(φ(ŷ) + ŵ) are proportional.
Proof of the no-trade property











: (z − z′)(Ĉm(z)− Ĉm(z′)) < 0
}
and let us assume that µ⊗µ (A) > 0.
By Fubini, there exists z∗ such that µ (B) > 0 with B =
{
z > z∗ : Ĉm(z∗) > Ĉm(z))
}
. Let
us consider ŷ′ such that ŷ′ = z∗ on {ŷ ∈ B} and ŷ′ = ŷ elsewhere. We have ŷ′ ≤ ŷ and
then ŷ′ ∈ Y and Ĉm(ŷ′) > Ĉm(ŷ) which contradicts the fact that ŷ maximizes Um(Ĉm(ŷ))
on Y. Hence, Ĉm(z) is nondecreasing and Ĉm(z) admits a derivative with respect to z almost






. As Ĉm is nondecreasing,






⊂ [0,∞] for all z with Ĉ ′m,−(z) = Ĉ ′m,+(z) = Ĉ ′m(z)
almost everywhere on R+. Let y ∈ Y, v = y − ŷ and 0 < ε < 1. We have ŷ + εv ∈ Y and
Um(Ĉm(ŷ)) ≥ Um(Ĉm(ŷ)+εv) and Um(Ĉm(ŷ))−Um(Ĉm(ŷ)+εv)εv v ≥ 0 which, by Fatou’s Lemma gives
E
[(







≤ 0 for all v and then Ĉ ′m,+(ŷ)1v≥0 +
Ĉ ′m,−(ŷ)1v≤0 ∈ NY (ŷ). As ŷ ∈ Eff+(Y ), it has a density hŷ with hŷ > 0, µ−a.e. on R∗+and
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m(ŷ) almost everywhere on Ω which gives Ĉ
′
m(ŷ) ∈ NY (ŷ) or
Ĉ ′m(ŷ)M
mu′(ĉm) = νp̂, (33)
for some ν > 0. From Equations (31) and (33), we thus obtain that :(
Ĉ ′m − νφ′
)
(ŷ)Mmu′(ĉm) = 0 (34)
As ŷ ∈ Eff+(Y ), it takes all possible values in (0,∞) and we have
Ĉ ′m(z) = νφ
′(z), a.e.
Integrating with respect to z, we obtain
Ĉm(z) = νφ(z) + k (35)
for some constant k. From item 3 of Definition 1, we have Ĉm(z) ≤ z hence Ĉm(0) = 0 which
implies k = 0 and
Ĉm(z) = νφ(z), ∀z ∈ R+. (36)
As q̂ · Ĉm = q̂ · φ(ŷ), ν = 1 and Ĉm = φ.
Proof of Um(φ(ŷ)) > Um(φ(y)) for all y ∈ Y − {ŷ}
To prove Assertion 4, from item 2 of Definition 1 and from the last result, we have
Vm(ŷ, q̂) = Um(Ĉm(ŷ)) = Um(φ(ŷ)).
As φ(y) is a feasible consumption plan for the manager when she is given y, Vm(y, q̂) ≥ Um(φ(y)),
therefore
Vm(ŷ, q̂) = Um(φ(ŷ)) > Vm(y, q̂) ≥ Um(φ(y)), ∀y ∈ Y − {ŷ} ,
proving Assertion 4.
Proof of the production equilibrium property
From the first item in the definition of the m-s equilibrium, ĉi maximizes U i(c) s.t. c ∈
C(ŷ), q̂ · c ≤ νi(q̂ · (ŷ − φ(ŷ))). Let c /∈ C(ŷ) such that q̂ · c ≤ νi(q̂ · (ŷ − φ(ŷ))). Taking
the expectation conditional to ŷ, we have q̂ · E [c| ŷ] ≤ νi(q̂ · (ŷ − φ(ŷ))). Since E [c| ŷ] ∈
C(ŷ), U i(E [c| ŷ]) ≤ U i(ĉi) and, by concavity of U i, U i(c) ≤ U i(ĉi). We therefore have that ĉi
maximizes U i(c) s.t. q̂ · c ≤ νi(q̂ · (ŷ − φ(ŷ))), for all i. We conclude the proof of Assertion 5
thanks to Assertion 2 and the market clearing condition.
Proof of the equilibrium property for W ′ ⊂W
In order to prove assertion 6, it suffi ces to remark that if the manager does no trade when
allowed to make transactions in W, she will not trade when only allowed to make transactions
in W ′ ⊂W and since all the other conditions do not involve W, we have the result.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let q̂ ∈ C(ŷ) and ((ĉi)i, q̂, ŷ − φ(ŷ)) be a production equilibrium.
Then ĉi maximizes U i(c) s.t. q̂ · c ≤ νi(q̂ · (ŷ − φ(ŷ))). As q̂ · ĉi = νi(q̂ · (ŷ − φ(ŷ))), taking the
conditional expectation with respect to ŷ, we obtain that q̂ ·E
[
ĉi





∣∣ ŷ] is budget feasible and from Jensen’s conditional inequality, as U i is strictly concave,
U i(ĉi) ≤ U i(E
[
ĉi
∣∣ ŷ]) with a strict inequality unless ĉi = E [ ĉi∣∣ ŷ]. As the strict inequality
would contradict the definition of ĉi, we have ĉi = E
[
ĉi
∣∣ ŷ] and therefore ĉi ∈ C(ŷ) for every i.
It also follows that V i(ŷ, q̂) ≥ V i(y, q̂) for any y and i. The remainder is immediate.
Proof of Corollary 3. From Assertion 2 of Theorem 1, we have q̂ · (ŷ − φ(ŷ)) = maxY q̂ ·
(y − φ(y)) . From the first order condition, we have (1 − φ′(ŷ))q̂ ∈ NY (ŷ) . We also have
Um(φ(ŷ)) = maxY Um(φ(y)) which gives φ′(ŷ)Mmu(φ(ŷ)) ∈ NY (ŷ) . Finally, by definition of
the representative shareholder, we have N(λ∗)u′(ŷ − φ(ŷ)) = νq̂. Since all elements in NY (ŷ)
are positively proportional, we have the result.
Proof of Corollary 4. The 2 first assertions are from Bianchi et al. (2021). The third one
is immediate.
Proof of the strict monotonicity of φ and Id − φ. Since φ is nondecreasing, let I an
interval on which it is constant. We have φ′ = 0 on I and then µ(1−φ′(z))(z−φ(z))γ−1g(z) = 0
on I. Since all the beliefs are equivalent and since ŷ is such that hŷ > 0, we have g > 0 a.e. on
I. Furthermore, φ′(z) = 0 6= 1 on I and φ cannot be equal to z a.e. on I. We have then µ = 0
and φ′ = 0 everywhere and φ is constant. Since φ(0) = 0 we have φ = 0 which is excluded by
condition 4 in the definition of a m-s equilibrium. We have then that φ is increasing. The result
on z → z − φ(z) is derived similarly.
Proof of Corollary 5. When M i = Mm =: M for all i, h = 1 and (11) becomes: for some
µ > 0
φ′(z)φ(z)γ−1 = µ(1− φ′(z))(z − φ(z))γ−1, for all z ≥ 0.
It may easily be verified that for any γ < 1 and any 0 < α < 1, φα(z) = αz is a solution of
the differential equation above. If there exists a production equilibrium ((ĉi)i, q̂, ŷ) associated
to Y such that q̂ ∈ C(ŷ), ((1 − α)ĉi, q̂, (1 − α)ŷ) is a production equilibrium associated to
(1 − α)Y such that q̂ ∈ C(ŷ) and ŷ solves maxY E(Mu(y)). By homogeneity of u, it also
solves maxY E(Mu(φα(y)). The list ((φα, {0}), ((1− α)ĉi)i, αŷ, q̂, ŷ) thus fulfills the conditions
of theorem 2.










with β = exp(a
2−b2
σ2
) and α = b−a
σ2
. Equation (11) becomes φ′(z)φγ−1(z) = βµ(1 − φ′(z))(z −
φ(z))γ−1φ(z)α or φ′(z) = βµz
αφ(z)1−γ
(z−φ(z))1−γ+βµzαφ(z)1−γ = A(z, φ(z)) with A(z, s) =
βµzαµs1−γ
(z−s)1−γ+βµzαµs1−γ





2 which has the sign of −z+ zα+ zγ − sα = 0
that cancels only for z = s αα+γ−1 . Hence, for
α
α+γ−1 > 1 or α > 1 − γ, we have A(s, s) = 1,















< 1 is then a minimum for
A(z, s) on [s,∞) .We have then φ′(z) ≥ 1











easily leads to lim∞ φ(z) = ∞ and lim∞ φ′(z) = 1. We have then φ′(z) (1 +Bφ(z)−α) ≥ 1 and




≥ z − 1. We have
seen that lim∞ φ(z) = ∞ hence, for sup(1, 1− γ) < α , we have lim∞ φ1−α(z) = 0 which gives
lim∞
φ(z)








and the share ŷ − φ(ŷ) of the production left to the shareholder is bounded above.
Remark that replacing α by −α, and φ(z) by z − φ(z) does not modify our differential
30
equation above which means that the behavior of manager’s compensation φ(ŷ) for α > 0 is the
same as the behavior of the share of the production ŷ − φ(ŷ) left to the shareholder for α < 0
and conversely. The case −α > sup(1, 1− γ) is then immediate.














z ∼0 γµh(z) and
ψµ(z)
z →0 ∞. Let u be given, for u suffi ciently







γ−1du > µMzγ−1 for z suffi ciently large.





> γµM and ψµ(z)z →∞ ∞. The case γ < 0 is
treated similarly.
Proof of Corollary 9. We have φ(z) = ψµ((Id + ψµ)







If x = (Id + ψµ)
−1 (z), we have ψµ(x) + x = z then x ≤ z and, in particular, (Id+ψµ)
−1(z)
z ≤ 1
and limz→0 (Id + ψµ)
−1 (z) = 0. Since ψµ is nondecreasing and defined on R+, it is also
easy to check that limz→∞ (Id + ψµ)






= 0 which gives limz→0,∞ κµ(z) = 0. If γ > 0, we have xχµ(x)z +
x
z = 1
and the second term is negligible with respect to the first one for x (or equivalently for z) near
to 0 or to ∞. Since we have xχµ(x)z =
ψµ(x)
z = κµ(z), it comes limz→0,∞ κµ(z) = 1.
Let us consider the case where the manager is more optimistic than all the shareholders. we
have then limỹ→∞
N(λ̃)
Mm = 0 and limỹ→0
N(λ̃)
Mm =∞, lim∞ h(z) = 0 and lim0 h(z) =∞.
Proof of Corollary 10. If the manager is more optimistic than all the shareholders and
γ > 0, the function g : v → h(v
1
γ ) is such that lims→∞ g(s) = 0 and then lims→∞ 1s
∫ s
0 g(v)dv = 0
and limz→∞
ψµ(z)γ






γ )dv = 0. The limit in 0, the case γ < 0 and the
case where the manager is more pessimistic than all the shareholders are treated similarly. The
properties on κ are derived as in the proof of Corollary 9.






where θ is given. Let us show


































where λθ the square root of shareholder δ equilibrium utility weight (when that of the other
shareholder is normalized to one) is the nonnegative solution of
λ2 exp(−θδ
√
t)ν−δ + λ exp(−
δ2
2
)(2ν−δ − 1) + exp(θδ
√
















satisfies the first-order conditions for utility maximization as well as the mar-





θ,−δ] = ν−δE [qθyθ]. After simple calculations, this constraint appears to be equivalent
to (37). It is also straightforward to show that (37) admits only one positive solution. Let us





a yθ̃-exchange equilibrium, we need only take care of the profit maximization constraint. For











For such a θ̃, ỹ = yθ̃ satisfies the first order condition for profit maximization. Under condition
(24), we can show that gσ(θ̃, σ) is positive for σ < θ̃ and negative for σ > θ̃ which means that




is a production equilibrium,
Proof of Remark 12. The analytic expressions of Em [x̃] and Varm [x̃] are obtained












hence if λθ̃ < 1 and λθ̃ 6= 0 (or νδ 6= 0), we have










While for λθ̃ ≥ 1 and if λθ̃ 6=∞ (or νδ 6= 1), we have



















Proof of Theorem 1, Point 1.. Proof of the monotonicity of z → φ(z) and z →
z − φ(z)
Let us show first that z → φ(z) and z → z − φ(z) are both nondecreasing a.e. in the sense
µ⊗ µ
({
(z, z′) ∈ R2 : (z − z′)(ϕ(z)− ϕ(z′)) < 0
})
= 0.
We have ĉm ∈ C(ŷ) and there exists a nonnegative measurable function C such that ĉm =
C(ŷ). By Lebesgue Theorem, the derivative of z →
∫ z
0 C(s)ds exists and is equal to C(z)
almost everywhere. Let F (z) = E [Mm| ŷ = z] and let us assume that µ(G) = 0 where G =
{z : F (z) = 0} . We have 0 =
∫
z∈G F (z)hy(z)dz = E [Mm1ŷ∈G] and Mm > 0 a.e. which gives
Mm = 0 a.e. on G and since Mm > 0 a.e., we have µ (G) = 0.




= C(z), φ is continuous at z, F (z) > 0 and
hy(z) > 0. We have µ (R+\D) = 0.







: (z − z′)(φ(z)− φT (z′)) < 0
}
.
We have, µ2 (A) > 0. Without loss of generality, we may replace A by A ∩ C2.
Let (a, b) ∈ A with a < b and then
φ(a) > φ(b) .
For η > 0, there exists ε > 0 such that |φ(z)− φ(a)| < ηφ(a) for z ∈ I = [a− ε, a+ ε) and
|φ(z)− φ(b)| < ηφ(b) for z ∈ J = [b− ε, b+ ε). If η and ε are chosen such that 1−η1+η
φ(a)
φ(b) > 1 and
ε < b−a2 , we have I < J and φ(I) > φ(J). It is immediate that φ(a) <
1
1−ηφ(z) for z ∈ I and
φ(b) < 11−ηφ(z) for z ∈ J.
Let f : R → R \ J be defined by f(z) = 12 (a− ε) +
1
2z on I, f(z) = a +
1
2 (z − b+ ε) on J
and f(z) = z elsewhere. We have f(z) ≤ z for all z and f admits an inverse denoted by g.
If z ∈ I then f(z) ∈ I, and |φ(z)− φ(f(z))| < 2ηφ(a) < 2η1−ηφ(z).We further impose
2η
1−η < 1
and we have φ(f(z)) > (1− 2η1−η )φ(z).
If z ∈ J then f(z) ∈ I and
φ(z)− φ(f(z)) < (1 + η)φ(b)− (1− η)φ(a) < 0. (38)
We also have φ(f(z)) < (1 + η)φ(a) < kφ(z) with k = 1+η1−η
φ(a)
φ(b) > 1.
Elsewhere, we have φ(z) = φ(f(z)).
Let us define the random variable ỹ by ỹ = f(ŷ). We have ỹ ≤ ŷ then ỹ ∈ Y. By definition
of g, we have ŷ = g(ỹ). They generate then the same information structure and we have
C(ỹ) = C(ŷ).
By definition of the indirect utility function, Vm(ŷ, q̂) = Um(ĉm). Let ŵ be defined by
ŵ = ĉm−φ(ŷ), we have ŵ ∈ C(ŷ)∩W and q̂ · ŵ ≤ 0. If we define c̃m by c̃m = φ(ỹ)+(1−ε 2η1−η )ŵ,
c̃m is a function of ỹ. We further impose ε < 1.
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On {ŷ ∈ I} , c̃m = φ(f(ŷ)) + (1− ε 2η1−η )ŵ > (1−
2η
1−η ) (φ(ŷ) + ŵ) ≥ (1−
2η
1−η )ĉm ≥ 0. From
there, we derive u(ĉm) − u(c̃m) ≤
(
1− (1− 2η1−η )
γ
)
u(ĉm). By the market clearing condition,
we have ĉm ≤ ŷ and u(ĉm)− u(c̃m) ≤
(




On {ŷ ∈ J} , c̃m = φ(f(ŷ)) + (1− ε 2η1−η )ŵ > φ(ŷ) + (1−
2η
1−η )ŵ > (1−
2η
1−η ) (φ(ŷ) + ŵ) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, since u is increasing and concave, we have
u(ĉm)− u(c̃m)
≤ u (φ(ŷ) + ŵ)− u
(









where c = ĉm if φ(ŷ) − φ(f(ŷ)) + ε 2η1−η ŵ ≥ 0 and c = φ(f(ŷ)) + (1 − ε
2η
1−η )ŵ ≤ k (φ(ŷ) + ŵ)
elsewhere.









and since (1 + η)φ(b)− (1− η)φ(a) < 0, we have
u(ĉm)− u(c̃m)













Finally, on {ŷ /∈ I ∪ J} , c̃m = φ(ŷ) + (1− ε 2η1−η )ŵ ≥ (1− ε
2η
1−η ) (φ(ŷ) + ŵ) = (1− ε
2η
1−η )ĉm ≥ 0.
Furthermore, since u is increasing u(ĉm)−u(c̃m) ≤ u(ĉm)−u
(














We have then c̃m ≥ 0 a.e. and then c̃m ∈ Cm(ỹ). Furthermore, we have q̂·c̃m = q̂·φ(ỹ)+q̂·ŵ ≤
q̂ ·φ(ỹ) which gives Vm(ỹ, q̂) ≥ Um(c̃m). From Condition 4 in the equilibrium definition, we have
Um(ĉm) = Vm(ŷ, q̂) > Vm(ỹ, q̂) ≥ Um(c̃m). (39)
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Let us show that Mmu′ (ĉm) ŵ ∈ L1(Ω,F , P ) and for this purpose let us consider separately
its positive part and its negative part. Since u is increasing, the sign of Mmu′ (ĉm) ŵ only
depends on the sign of ŵ. Let us define cε by cε = φ(ŷ) + (1− ε) ŵ, we have cε ∈ C(ŷ) ∩W
and q̂ · cε ≤ q̂ · φ(ŷ) which gives U(cε) ≤ U(ĉm). For ŵ ≥ 0, we have 0 ≤ u(ĉm)−u(cε)ε ≤
u′ (φ(ŷ)) ŵ and since u(ĉm)−u(cε)ε → u








′ (φ(ŷ)) ŵ1ŵ≥0] < ∞. Let us assume
that −E [Mmu′ (ĉm) ŵ1ŵ≤0] = ∞. Since u is increasing, we have (u(cε)− u(ĉm)) 1ŵ≤0 ≥ 0













=∞ which gives U(cε) > U(ĉm) for ε suffi ciently small.
We have then a contradiction and then −E [Mmu′ (φ(ŷ)) ŵ1ŵ≤0] <∞ which gives L1(Ω,F , P ).


















= (1− (1− 2η
1− η )
γ)F (a)u(a)
+ kγ−1 ((1 + η)φ(b)− (1− η)φ(a))F (a)u′(a)
+ γ
η
1− ηE [Mmu(ĉm)] .
Taking the limit when η goes to 0, we obtain kγ−1 (φ(b)− φ(a))F (a)u′(a) < 0.
Hence, for η and ε suffi ciently small, Um(φ(ŷ) + ŵ) < Um(φ(ỹ) + ŵ) which contradicts 39.
Therefore, the compensation z → φ(z) is increasing.
Similarly, replacing the manager by one of the shareholders, we obtain that the net produc-
tion z → z − φ(z) is increasing.
Proof of the differentiability of z → φ(z) and z → z − φ(z)
Since z → φ(z) and z → z − φ(z) are nondecreasing then z → φ(z) is 1-Lipshitz and then
differentiable a.e.
Lemma 14 For (x, x′) ∈ X2+ and ε > 0, there exists x′′ ∈ X+ such that 0 ≤ x′ − x′′ ≤ εx′ and
C(x) ⊂ C(x′′). In particular, if x′ ∈ Y then x′′ ∈ Y.
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Proof of Lemma 14. Let sn = (1 + ε)
n
2 for n ∈ Z. The family S = (sn)n∈Z is an
ordered family with lim∞ sn = ∞, lim−∞ sn = 0. Let z ≥ 0 and z′ > 0. There exits n ∈ Z
such that sn ≤ z′ < sn+1 and we define h by h(z, z′) = sn − (sn − sn−1) z1+z . We have
0 < (1− ε) z′ < (1− ε) sn+1 ≤ sn−1 < h(z, z′) ≤ sn ≤ z′ < sn+1. Let us suppose now that we
know h(z, z′) without knowing z nor z′. The inequalities sn−1 < h(z, z′) ≤ sn uniquely define
a pair (sn, sn−1). z is uniquely determined by the equation h(z, z′) = sn − (sn − sn−1) z1+z .
Let (x, x′) ∈ X2+, and let x′′ = h(x, x′). We have (1− ε)x′ < x′′ ≤ x′ or 0 ≤ x′ − x′′ ≤ εx′.
Furthermore, knowing x′′ permits to determine x and we have C(x) ⊂ C(x′′). Finally, if x′ ∈ Y
then x′′ ≤ x′ leads to x′′ ∈ Y.
Corollary 15 We assume that M i = Mm for all i, and that there exists a unique production
equilibrium ((ĉi)i, q̂, ŷ) that satisfies Um(ŷ) ≥ U∗, then





is a m-s equilibrium
that satisfies (RU),
2. if ((φ̌, W̌ ), (či)i, φ̌ (ŷ) , q̌, ŷ) is a m-s equilibrium that satisfies (RU) then q̂ · φ̂ (ŷ) ≤ q̂ · φ̌ (ŷ) .
Proof of Corollary 15. The case γ > 0 is immediate. The first assertion is also immediate






compensation m-s equilibrium that satisfies (RU). Without any loss of generality, we may assume
that M i = 1 for all i and we have q̂ = ŷγ−1. Let us assume that γ < 0 and let us consider
((φ̌, W̌ ), (či)i, φ̌(ŷ), q̌, ŷ) a m-s equilibrium that satisfies (RU) and that minimizes q̂ · φ̌(ŷ) among
all the other compensation schemes that are compatible with ŷ. By Corollary 5, we may restrict
our attention to the compensation schemes φ̌ = φµ,C with φ
γ
µ,C(z) = C + µ(z − φµ,C(z))γ for















µ (−φµ,C(z) + z)γ−1 + φµ,C(z)γ−1
) < 0,
and ϕµ,C(y) is decreasing in µ and C. Both quantities q̂ ·ϕµ,C(ŷ) and Um(ĉm) = Um(ϕµ,C(ŷ)) are
then decreasing in µ and C. The compensation cost minimization leads then to Um(φ̂(ŷ)) = U∗.




= U∗. By the
























and since the shareholders minimize q̂ · φµ,C(ŷ), this leads to the following first order condition
d
dC





q̂ · φµ,C(ŷ) = 0.




























ŷγ−1 (−φµ,C(ŷ) + ŷ)γ
γ
(





































where E∗ is the expectation under the probability whose density with respect to P is given by
M






, (−φµ,C(ŷ) + ŷ)γ
)
= 0.
On one hand, we know that−φµ,C(z) + z increases with z and (−φµ,C(ŷ) + ŷ)γ is then de-








































and (−φµ,C(ŷ) + ŷ)γ are then comonotonic and





, (−φµ,C(ŷ) + ŷ)γ
)






, (−φµ,C(ŷ) + ŷ)γ
)
< 0. The first order condition leads then to C = 0 and
φµ,C is linear with φµ,C(z) = az for some a. With the reservation utility condition we conclude
that φ̌ = φ̂.
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10.2 Appendix C
Proof of theorem 7
Proof. Let us show that ((φµ, {0}), (ĉi)i, φµ(ŷ), q̂, ŷ) with ŷ = ỹ+ψµ(ỹ) is a m-s equilibrium
associated to the production set Yµ = Y+ψµ(Y). From Theorem 2, as Y φµ = Y has a production
equilibrium ((ĉi)i, q̂, ỹ), it remains to show that ŷ = ỹ + ψµ(ỹ) strictly maximizes u(φµ(y)) on
Yµ or equivalently as Yµ = Y + ψµ(Y) that ỹ strictly maximizes u(ψµ(y)) on Y. As u ◦ ψµ is
strictly concave, it is equivalent to show that Mmψ′µ(ỹ)u
′(ψµ(ỹ)) ∈ NY(ỹ). From (12) and (
16), we have
Mmψ′µ(ỹ)ψµ(ỹ)
γ−1 = µN(λ̃)ỹγ−1 = µN(λ̃)u′(ỹ).
As the representative shareholder of the production equilibrium ((ĉi)i, q̂, ỹ) maximizes at ỹ the
utility of the net production on Y which is smooth, we have N(λ̃)u′(ỹ) ∈ NY(ỹ) proving the
desired result.
As the statement of Theorem 7 requires the existence of a production equilibrium associated
to Y, let us provide conditions on Y under which a production equilibrium exists. To this end,
let us first introduce a definition and an assumption. We will say that Y is strictly convex from
above if for (y1, y2) ∈ Y2 and t ∈ (0, 1) , there exists y ∈ Y such that ty1 + (1− t)y2 < y.17
Assumption (P’)
P’1 Y = K −X+ where K ⊂ X+ and such that 0 < ς ≤ K ≤ Ξ,
P’2 Y is closed, strictly convex from above and smooth,
P’3 If y ∈Eff+(Y), the random variable y has a positive density on (0, ay) for some ay ∈
R ∪ {∞} .
P’4 For all i, M iςγ−1 belongs to X ′ and M iςγ and M iΞγ belong to L1 (Ω,F , P ) .
Assumption (P’) provides conditions on Y under which a production equilibrium exists. The
following corollary can then be easily derived.
Corollary 16 Assume (P’), then there exists a unique production equilibrium ((ĉi)i, q̂, ỹ) asso-
ciated to Y. Let ψµ be defined by (17) and φµ by (18). Assume (H), q̂ ∈ C(ỹ), Mm ∈ C(ỹ) and
u◦ψµ strictly concave. Then ((φµ, {0}), (ĉi)i, φµ(ŷ), q̂, ŷ) with ŷ = ỹ+ψµ(ỹ) is a m-s equilibrium
associated to the production set Yµ = Y + ψµ(Y).
Proof. The existence and uniqueness result is adapted from Bianchi et al. (2021). The rest
is immediate.
17Let us recall that Y is strictly convex when for all (y1, y2) ∈ Y 2 and t ∈ (0, 1) , there exists ty1 + (1− t)y2 ∈
int(Y). It is immediate that strict convexity implies strict convexity from above. However strict convexity is a
much stronger condition and requires, in particular, a nonempty interior.
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